Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts

Apr 7, 2009

"That Which Belongs To None Belongs To Every One" : Arctic Climate Change & Energy Geopolitics


Verne wrote about energy resources (coal) in the Arctic & the possibility of human-engineered climate change resulting in enhanced access to these resources. Credits


Scott Borgerson, in his article "The Great Game Moves North", in the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs notes that rapidly changing Arctic climate could has countries such as Russia, Denmark, Canada, Norway, and the U.S. coming up with plans to tap the resources of this region. I did not realize it when I read the article, but in Jules Verne's The Purchase of The North Pole (aka Topsy-Turvy (Project Gutenberg)), the same nations (except for U.K. instead of Canada, Netherlands and Sweden-Norway instead of Norway) participate in an auction organized by the North Polar Practical Association to claim ownership of the earth's surface from 84 oN to 90 oN. In this article, I will compare fact and fiction to draw some conclusions on Arctic energy geopolitics.

The quote in the title comes from "The Purchase of the North Pole". In contrast to fiction, Borgerson contends that U.S. still has to verify the U.N. Law of Sea Convention, improve cooperation with Canada and retrofit its aging icebreaker fleet. According to the USGS, the Arctic likely has 13% of the world's undiscovered oil (90 billion barrels) and 30% of the world's undiscovered gas (1670 trillion cubic feet). Whereas more than 70% of the undiscovered oil resource is estimated to occur in Arctic Alaska, Amerasia Basin, East Greenland Rift Basin, East Barents Basin and West Greenland-East Canada basins, the distribution of natural gas is more concentrated. More than 70% of undiscovered natural gas resources is estimated to occur in West Siberian Basin (Russia), East Barents Basin and Arctic Alaska (USGS factsheet, pdf). The USGS estimated that it would take 37 $/barrel to produce oil from a big (billion barrel) field. Note that the associated natural gas produced is reinjected in these calculations. The WSJ points out that:
[L]arge parts of the Arctic, especially offshore, remain unexplored.

In his article, Borgerson notes:
At the same time, Arctic countries are closely collaborating on mapping the area's seafloor, with scientists from one country frequently sailing on icebreakers of another. On the face of it, everyone seems to be getting along swimmingly.
But all of this camaraderie is at odds with the growing remilitarization of the Arctic. The region is in the midst of transforming from a frozen, sleepy backwater into a potential epicenter of world affairs. How this all plays out in the geopolitical development of the region is a story that is very much still being written.

Arguments in support of various countries' claims to portions of the Arctic can be found here. A map showing various claims in shown below. An interactive version of the map can be found at Spiegel online.

Map of Russian Arctic claims © BBC



Russian developments constitute a major portion of Borgerson's article. He notes that Russia has the largest icebreaker fleet, and that Gazprom is aggressively developing the Shtokman natural gas field, and considering potential future LNG exports to the US eastern seaboard. Interestingly, Borgerson also notes that countries without Arctic coastlines such as China, South Korea, Japan are also participating in Arctic expeditions or are involved in building icebreakers and ice-strengthened tankers.

My opinions:
There are indications that the Arctic likely contains large oil and gas resources. However, the comparatively high cost of crude production in the Arctic indicate that production would not be economical in a market with low crude prices. Additionally, developing the natural gas resource located in the Russian Arctic is likely to involve significant investments in infrastructure, either as liquefied natural gas (LNG)-carrying tankers, or floating production and offloading platforms where the gas is converted on-board to liquid fuels such as methanol. The prospect of refreezing winter seas and rough weather would make operations on oil and gas production platforms a dangerous affair by today's standards. Therefore, I would expect the shipping/tanker companies to be the initial beneficiaries of an ice-free Arctic. Projects such as the Shtokman field would benefit from seasonal ice-free shipping lanes which reduce distances to markets, both in the US as well as South-East Asia/Far East.

Unlike the events in Verne's novel, where the representatives of Britain, Sweden-Norway, Holland, Denmark and Russia agree to form a syndicate against the American-represented North Polar Practical Association, alliances over the ice-free oceans would be tenuous. Recently, Denmark and Canada held talks on the delineation of the limits of the outer continental shelf. The Russian claim over the North Pole would be evaluated by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) this May. It is in U.S. interests to ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to have a role in these discussions. Regardless of these outcomes, one fact stands clear; no diplomat or leader can dare to think in similar lines to Jacques Jansen, the Netherlands' representative to the Arctic auction in Jules Verne's novel, who scoffs at the value of the Arctic ocean:
It would be much better to buy a load of codfish than to throw one’s money into the ice-water of the North.

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Mar 2, 2009

Oil geopolitics in Central Asia & the Caucasus



View Larger Map

South Caucasus




View Larger Map

Central Asia


Here is a America Abroad Media program on oil politics in former USSR republics. The program notes the tug-of-war between Western nations (NATO) and China & Russia (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) for the region's oil & gas resources.


Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and other pipelines. Credit: Wikipedia


Historically, this region had Russian, Persian, Turkish, and Chinese political, cultural and social influences. As one of the commentators alluded to, this is a fight for the control of the center of the oil & gas-rich Eurasian landmass. As they say in chess, it is all about controlling the center.

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Jan 14, 2009

Russian Roulette: Energy geopolitics in the Russia-Ukraine gas row II


Map showing Russian natural gas pipelines. Credit: Energy Information Administration. Higher resolution version available here.


Stratfor has an article on the wider geopolitical consequences of the Russia-Ukraine natural gas dispute. In an earlier article, I briefly looked at other options to displace a portion of European natural gas imports from Russia. In this article, I will examine some of these options in greater detail.
The article discusses the current dispute viewed through the foggy lens of Russo-Ukranian relations.
"...before 2004, the Russian-Ukrainian natural gas spat was simply part of business as usual. But now, Russia feels that its life is on the line, and that it has the financial room to maneuver to push hard — and so, the annual ritual of natural gas renegotiations has become a key Russian tool in bringing Kiev to heel."

Currently, 80% of European natural gas imports from Russia transit through Ukraine.

Russian exports to Europe via different pipelines, data from EIA. Abbreviations: u.c.: under construction

Apart from these Russian exports of natural gas, Europe also plans to import natural gas (liquefied or pipeline) through fields in Norway, Libya, Caribbean and Azerbaijan, totaling 117.5 billion m3/year by 2010. This will decrease European dependence on Russian natural gas imports. Among other things, the article differentiates German and other European approaches to Russia. This is because most of the German natural gas imports from Russia (43% of its natural gas consumption) transits through the Yamal-Europe I pipeline via Belarus and not Ukraine.

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Jan 5, 2009

Energy geopolitics: the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute


Map of European natural gas pipelines. Credits: BBC, Petroleum Economist.


The Ukraine-Russia natural gas price dispute is still not settled. Ukraine warns that European consumers might see gas shortages in the coming days if the row is not resolved.
Essentially, Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly wants to charge Ukraine 450 $/1000 m3 (MCM) of gas, a 150% increase from the existing rate of 179 $/1000 MCM. Because 40% of the gas to EU nations passes through Ukraine, a shut-off of Russian gas to Ukraine affects the downstream consumers. The figure is a map of proposed and existing natural gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage terminals in-and-around Europe. Although Russia claims that part of the gas passing through Ukraine could be diverted via Belarus, consumers in Hungary, Poland Romania and Bulgaria have reported drops in natural gas supply. Here is a somewhat dated presentation describing the natural gas supply and demand outlook for EU-30 nations. According to this, net EU natural gas imports will grow to 670 billion cubic meters (BCM) of natural gas by 2030, accounting for 70% of the natural gas suppply. Of this, Russia is projected to supply 220 BCM (one-third of natural gas imports) by 2030. From this presentation, it is apparent that Russia has one of the the lowest costs for supplying natural gas on a $/MMBTU basis. The BBC has an interesting article on regional geopolitics that might play a role in resolving this issue.

What other options do European countries have in the long-term?
Poland has 24400 million short tons (Mmst) of coal, and is a big regional coal producer. Coal-to-gas technologies could play a significant minor role in displacing Russian natural gas in the long-term. If we assume that 1 short ton of coal produces 20 MMBTU, of which 30% is recoverable as natural gas equivalent heat, the entire Polish coal resource potential is ~4446 BCM in natural gas equivalents, much higher than the 40 BCM/year natural gas consumption in the Visegrad region. On the other hand, with additional European CO2 regulations, investment in technologies with low-carbon emissions(nuclear, wind, biomass) are projected to increase. However, it is not clear if these would displace a significant portion of the EU natural gas demand.

Conclusion: In the short-term, alternatives for relatively clean Russian natural gas might be difficult to find. European coal has a role to play in displacing some portion of Russian natural gas imports, but the long-term EU energy policy needs to address this issue in the context of geopolitics, GHG emissions, carbon trading frameworks and energy security.

See also: Russian Roulette: Energy geopolitics in the Russia-Ukraine gas row II

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